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Abstract. A subsystem ofKripke-Platek set theory proof-theoretically equiv-
alent to primitive recursive arithmetic is isolated; Aczel's (relative) consis-
tency argument for the Anti-Foundation Axiom is adapted to a (related) weak 
setting; and the logical complexity of the largest bisimulation is investigated. 
1 Introduction 
As every programmer understands, computing depends on coding: only what can be 
coded can be computed. Conversely, constraints on coding determine the sense in, 
and degree to which what can be coded can be computed. To a logician, it is natural 
to express these constraints in a formal system, and relate computation to proofs 
in that system.2 Strong systems such as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice, 
ZFC, allow all kinds of mathematical concepts to be coded as sets, however natural 
or unnatural these formulations might appear. Over a weaker set theory, coding can 
have greater computational significance, and even a somewhat odd and unlikely use 
of the notion of a set can sometimes prove fruitful. An instructive example is the 
set-theoretic coding of (countable) linguistic notions in Kripke-Platek set theory, KP 
(see Barwise [5)). 3 
More recently, the theory of non-well-founded sets presented in Aczel [4] has 
been applied in Barwise and Etchemendy [6] for a direct (i.e., natural?) set-theoretic 
coding of linguistic concepts with a possibly circular character. In this case, however, 
it is not clear that there is any need for infinite sets, and various alternatives4 to 
Aczel's conception of a non-well-founded set have been put forward that suffice for 
finite sets. By contrast, the consistency proof for the Anti-Foundation Axiom, AFA, 
given in Aczel [4] is carried out relative to the system ZFC- of ZFC minus foundation 
that supports a far richer notion of set than that of finite ones. So horrendously rich 
* The author is gratefully indebted to Prof. S. Feferman for supervision, to CWI for refuge, 
and to the Netherlands Organization fo1· the Advancement of Research (project NF 
102/62-356, 'Structural and Semantic Parallels in Natural Languages and Programming 
Languages') for funding. 
2 One way of measuring the computational character of a formal theory is through the 
provably 1·ecursive functions given by its JJg-theorems, which is used implicitly below. 
3 In what follows, KP is, as in Ba1·wise [5], not assumed to contain the axiom of infinity; 
otherwise, see Jager [12]. 
4 Mislove, Moss and Oles [16], Abramsky [1], and Rutten [20]. 
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a. notion, in fact, that the problem becomes what notion of computation can be 
associated with these sets. The question of the computational character of AFA is 
of particular interest given its origins in the (corn putational) theory of transition 
systems (see chapter 8 of Aczel [4]). In that work on Milner's SCCS as well as 
on transition systems given in Plotkin's SOS-style (Rutten [19]), infinite sets are 
involved. Furthermore, if transition systems are to be related to first-order models 
(and some such steps are taken in Fernando [10, 11]), then the question of identifying 
a weak set theory supporting both transition systems and first-order models arises. 
In any case, the present author's interest in analyzing AFA lies largely in its relation 
to the notion of a bisimulation - a notion fundamental to semantic attempts at 
explicating the dynamic nature of information. For such semantic investigations, it is 
natural to appeal not only to the ordinary notions of computability and decidability 
familiar to computer scientists, but also to subtle, set-theoretic notions.5 
Now, a logical analysis of AFA might proceed in various ways. Lindstrom [15) 
formalizes L. Hallnas' conception of non-well-founded sets in Martin-Lo£ type theory, 
building on a constructive version of ZF given in Aczel [3], that, as it turns out, is 
equivalent to ZF over classical logic. This equivalence blocks a direct understanding 
in terms of proof-theoretic measures (that at present fall far short of ZF). And from 
a classical model-theoretic point of view, it would be natural to replace ZFC by a 
theory, say KP, with many interesting models, and investigate the question mark? 
in the diagram 
Con(ZFC-) ==*' Con(ZFC- + AFA) 
.!J. .!). 
Oon(KP-) k Con(KP- + AFA) 
where Con is a consistency statement formulated in terms of models. It bears re-
peating that the theory KP- in the diagram might be enriched, so long as the models 
of interest are not ruled out. As will become clear below, the issue here is not the 
consistency of AFA, but its computational requirements. And these requirements are 
most clearly exposed in a theory more (directly) sensitive to constructive principles 
than ZFC-. 
This is not to say that ZFC- is devoid of any intuitions about construction. The 
"limitations of size" principle behind the set-class distinction has been so widely 
accepted and developed that it is perhaps not terribly appropriate to apply the 
label "set theory" to a theory supporting the existence of a universal set. And there 
are sound foundational reasons to look at finer questions of size (through a theory of 
"counting") given that the object w = {O, 1, ... } is infinitely more interesting (and 
complicated) than [2 = {J2}. A comparison of these two sets suggests that some 
care must be exercised in pushing the intuition that a non-well-founded set is a limit 
of well-founded sets, particularly when it leads to a universal set (as is the case in 
Abramsky [1]). 
5 Having said this, it should be pointed out that ordinary recursion-theoretic questions 
about processes have been studied; the reader might consult Ponse (18] and the references 
cited therein. 
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The approach taken below is to carry out Aczel's relative consistency argument 
for AFA in a weak setting connected with a view of mathematics that, although called 
finitist, can nonetheless support infinite objects. The reader is referred to Feferman 
(9] for background on proof-theoretic and foundational reductions related to consis-
tency arguments. For orientation, it is useful to note that the system PRA of primi-
tive recursive arithmetic is commonly associated with finitism, and (reminiscent of 
KP's suitability for countable syntactic notions) is adequate for formulating elemen-
tary syntactic notions (involved, for example, in Godel's incompleteness theorems). 
Briefly then, the next section describes a subsystem KP1 of KP proof-theoretically 
equivalent to PRA (building on the correspondence between hereditarily finite sets 
and natural numbers, the theory of primitive recursive set functions in Jensen and 
Karp (14], and the reduction in Parsons (17] of sr-IA to PRA). (The point here is that 
quantifier complexity for set theory is related but not identical to that for number 
theory.) Section 3 carries out Aczel's construction of a model of AFA in a primitive 
recursive framework provided by explicit mathematics (Feferman [8]) where a model 
of KP1 can be defined. Complications arising from the problem of preserving re-
stricted schemes of comprehension and collection motivate the discussion in section 
4 of computational "counting" principles for the largest bisimulation. 
2 A primitive recursive subsystem of KP 
The analysis below rests on the well-known correspondence between the natural 
numbers wand the hereditarily finite sets HF given by c: HF --. w 
and d: w--. HF 
dO := 0 
c0 :=0 
ea:= 2:2r.x 
:i:Ea. 
dn := {di I ith bit of n is 1} . 
Note that E (on HF) is a primitive recursive predicate 
dm E dn * odd([n/2]m) 
and accordingly is defined by 
te[m, n] = 0 
for some primitive recursive term te(x,y) in the language .C(PRA) of PRA. Now, we 
can describe an interpretation-* of .C(E) in .C(PRA) by passing syntactically from 
x E y to te(x, y) = 0, and semantically from an .C(PRA)-structure M = (M, ... ) to 
an .C( E)-structure M* = (M, E) where 
E := {(m, n) EM x M IM I= te[m, n] = O} . 
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Observe that by the elementary closure properties of primitive recursive predicates, 
every ..::lo-formula <p(x) in .C( E) -*-translates to the form (provably equivalent in 
P RA) of an equation 
t"'(x) = o . 
Going the other direction, we have an interpretation - 0 of .C( P RA) in .C( E) by the 
usual identification of natural numbers with finite ordinals. Note that the predicate 
w(x) in .C(E) is Llo. Furthermore, the (numerical) primitive recursive functions can 
be extracted as restrictions to w of primitive recursive set functions, to which we 
now turn. 
The primitive recursive set functions are given in Jensen and Karp [14] as follows. 
Close the initial functions 
under substitution 
F(x) = G(H1(x), ... , H1c(x)) 
and recursion 
F(x,w) =G(LJ F(u,w),x,w). 
uE"' 
The primitive recursive formulas are the defining formulas for the set functions 
above. For example, the defining formula !l>(x, w, y; <p(z, x, w, y)) for a function de-
rived by recursion from a function G with defining formula cp(z, x, w, y) is 
there is a function h such that h( x) = y and for all u in the domain of h, 
u ~ domain h and 
cp( LJ hv, u, w, hu) . 
11E11 
Let P RS be the (classical) first-order theory in the language of set theory con-
sisting of the axioms of extensionality, pairing, union, Llo-separation, induction on 
primitive recursive formulas cp 
Vz(\:/v E zcp(v) '.) <p(z)) '.) \:/z<p(z) 
and the E 1-recursion rule 
\:/z,x,w 3!y ip(z,x,w,y) 
Vx, w 31y !l>(x, w, y; cp(z, x, w, y)) 
where !l>(x,w,y;cp(z,x,w,y)) is the defining formula for the function derived by 
recursion from a L'1-formula ip(z, x, w, y). Transitive models of PRS are prim-closed 
in the sense of Jensen and Karp (14]. 
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Under suitable arithmetization, the collections of proofs in PRA and PRS are 
primitive recursive. Furthermore, a primitive recursive function can be constructed 
mapping (provably in PRA) axioms <p of PRS to PRA-proofs of <p*. Consequently, 
Proposition 1. (PRA) PRS f- r.p implies PRA f- r.p* • 
The converse of Proposition 1 fails because the sets that P RA - *-induces are "finite." 
(For a counter-example, take the .C( E)-sentence that asserts that every non-empty 
a set has an E-maximal element 
3x E a x E a :::> 3z E a Vx E a z 'i. x ; 
its -*-translation is a theorem of PRA.) We can, however, approximate a converse. 
As e0 is a primitive recursive formula for every .C(PRA)-equation e, another inductive 
argument on the the length of a proof yields 
Proposition 2. (PRS) PRA f- 7./J implies PRS f- 1/J 0 
Furthermore, every model M of PRA can be embedded in a model of PRS, namely 
M* via 7!' : M ~ M* 0 
whence 
7!'0 := 0 
7T(n + 1) := L 2"'m , 
m:Sn. 
Proposition 3. PRS is a conservative extension of PRA. 
Mention of primitive recursive formulas can be avoided altogether by asserting the 
principle of induction for all E 1-formulas. Set PRS1 to PRS with primitive recursive 
induction promoted to E1-induction (E11A). Now, the -*-translated content of the 
E1 -recursion rule does not change since Parsons [17] proved (in PRA) that if 
Er-IA f- \fn3mR(n, m) 
where R is primitive recursive, then 
PRA f- R(n, Jn) 
for some primitive recursive function /. The arguments for PRS and PRA adapt 
readily to yield 
Proposition 4. 1. (PRA) PRS1 f- r.p implies L'~-IA f- r.p* • 
2. (PRS) EP-IA f- 7/; implies PRS' f- 7j; 0 • 
3. PRS' is a conservative extension of EP-IA. 
As with Proposition 1, the converse to part 1 of Proposition 4 fails, which leads us 
to formulate 
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Lemma 5. Let if? be a primitive recursive collection of .C( E)-formulas for which there 
is, provably in EP -IA, a primitive recursive function f such that for every ip E qi, 
f ip is a EP -IA-proof of ip*. Then PRS' + 4"> is proof-theoretically equivalent to PRA. 
Sieg [21] contains a wealth of information concerning EP-IA, including "easy and 
helpful facts" (his words) such as 
(a) 11P-IA is equivalent to EP-IA (p. 46), and 
(b) EP-collection6 is contained in EP-IA (p. 53). 
Concerning point (b ), it is interesting to note that PRS' is a subsystem of the pred-
icative set theories in Feferman [7], and hence does not imply Llo-collection: 
\Ix E a3y ip(x, y) :J 3z\/x E a3y E z ip(x, y) 
for .do-formulas ip(x, y). (It has the same transitive models as PRS, including sets 
that are not admissible.) Nevertheless, 4"> in Lemma 5 can be taken to be Llo-
collection, by adapting Sieg's argument for (b ). 1 It is well-known that in the presence 
of Llo-collection, the distinction between E 1 - and E-formulas (also called generalized 
or essentially E 1-formulas) evaporates. As for point (a), this allows us to conclude 
that, defining the subsystem KP1 of KP as KP- + (E1 + 111 )1A (where KP- is KP 
minus foundation)8 , 
Theorem 6. KP1 is proof-theoretically equivalent to PRA. 
3 Aczel's AFA construction in a weak setting 
To shed light on the infinitary demands of AFA, it is natural (as argued in section 
1) to carry out Aczel [4]'s (relative) consistency argument for the axiom in a weaker 
6 These are arithmetic principles 
'ix< a 3y i.p(x,y)::) 3zVx <a 3y < z ip(x,y), 
where ip(x,y) is Er. 
1 Assume (in Er-IA) that 
(Vx E a3y ip(x,y))' 
where <p is '10. Now, calling the formula 
b :$a::) 3zVx < b3y < z te(x,b) == 0 :J (te(Y, z) = 0 /\ i.p*(x,y)) 
'ljJ(b), then as 'lji(O) and "tji(b) ::) 1/J(b + 1), it follows by Er-IA that (because te [m, n] = 0 
implies m < n) 
(::lzVx E a:ly E z i.p(x, y))" . 
8 The E 1-recursion rule is a consequence (relative to KP-) of ( E1 +JI i)IA. If the existence 
of the transitive closure of a set is added to KP- (as in work by Jager), then .II1IA is not 
necessary to justify the rule, although JI11A is useful for purposes other than proving the 
existence of transitive closures (see Barwise [5]), an example of which is given in section 
4 below. The author does not see how to derive II1IA from E1IA (in particular, how to 
adapt the argument in Sieg (21] reducing JI~-IA to E~-IA). 
102 
setting than ZFC-. Accordingly, over a model (S, :=:::!, E) of KP- (i.e., KP minus 
foundation), define the following. 
- A graph G is a pair (Na, ~a) with -+o s;; Na x Na. 
- A decoration of a graph G is a function d on No such that da ~ { db I a -+o b }. 
- The Anti-Foundation Axiom, AFA, is the assertion that every graph has a unique 
decoration. 
- A pointed graph (pg) is a pair (G, a) consisting of a graph G and a set a E Na.9 
- A bisimulation between graphs G and G1 is a set R such that whenever bRb', 
- Let 
Vx .._G b 3y .._G, b' xRy /\ Vy .._G, b' 3x .._G b xRy . 
Bis( R, G, a, G', a') <* "R is a bisimulation between G and G' 
such that aRa'" , 
and let So be the collection of all pg's, and ::::!o be the subcollection of So x So 
given by 
(G,a) :=::!o (G',a') *> 3R Bis(R,G,a,G',a'). 
The preceding definitions all refer to sets (i.e., objects in S), except for the collections 
Bis, So and ::::!o. These collections will serve as useful abbreviations, but where do 
they live? Rather than working in a framework where "limitations of size" lead, 
for example, to complications with quotients10 , it is possible instead to work in the 
framework of explicit mathematics (Feferman (8]), where 
(1) theories of weak proof-theoretic strength can be formulated naturally, and 
(2) the problem of quotients can be sidestepped by adopting Bishop's use of "equal-
ity" relations. 
Concerning point (1), observe that a model of KP1 can be defined (by numerically 
coding the hereditarily finite sets) in the theory APP+ ECA + Obj-indN described 
in Jager [13] (where it is stated, furthermore, to be proof-theoretically equivalent to 
PRA). As for point (2), this was anticipated above in isolating the interpretation :=:::! 
of equality on S. To go along with ~o, define the subclass Eo of So x So as follows 
(G,a) Eo (G',a') = 3b .._G, a' (G',b) ~o{G,a). 
Theorem 7. 11 If S, ;:::: and E are (APP+ ECA)-classes such that 
(S, ~, E) I= KP-
9 The notion of an accessible pointed graph is avoided at some aesthetic cost to push 
through the argument in KP-. 
10 Lemma 2.17 of Aczel [4] employs Scott's trick plus some choice principle to form a strongly 
extensional quotient. 
11 The author suspects (but has not had the energy to check all the necessary details) that 
the proof below can be formalized in APP+ ECA, plus, if necessary, Obj-indN. (Hence, the 
use of explicit mathematics.) But as it stands, the reduction claimed is model-theoretic, 
not proof-theoretic. 
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then (APP+ ECA)-classes So, ~o and Eo can be defined (as above) such that 
(So, ~o, Eo) I= Extensionality + Pair+ Union + AFA . 
Furthermore, the passage from (S, ~, E) to {So, ~o, Eo) preserves satisfaction of (full) 
Separation, (full) Collection, Infinity, Power, and Choice. 
Proof. First, observe that ECA supports the (class) definitions of S 0 , ::::::0 , and Eo from 
S, :=:::!, and E above since the only terms that occur qua class in the defining formulas 
are S, ::::J, and E. Second, to see that ~o is an equivalence relation is routine (assuming 
KP-): clearly, ~o is reflexive (since for every pg (G, a), the restriction of~ to NG is 
a bisimulation on G), symmetric (since if Risa bisimulation between G and G', then 
R- 1 is a bisimulation between G' and G), and transitive (since if Risa bisimulation 
between G and G', and R' is a bisimulation between G' and G11 , then R a R' is a 
bisimulation between G and G"). Third, although a quotient need not be formed, 
it is necessary to prove that Eo respects ::::Jo. So suppose ( G, a), ( G', a'), ( G 1, a1) and 
( Gi, aD E So satisfy 
(G1,a1) ::::Jo (G,a) Eo (G',a') ~o (G~,a~), 
with the object of showing 
Since (G1 ,a1) ~o (G1,ai), there is a bisimulation R between G' and Gi relating a' 
to ai, and since (G, a) Eo ( G', a'), there is a b <-a' a1 with ( G', b) ~o (G, a). Choose 
a b1 E Na~ such that bRb1 and ai -.G~ b1. Then (G',b) ~o (Gi,b1) (via R), whence 
(Gi,b1) ~o (G1,a1) (as required) since (G',b) ::::Jo (G,a) ::::Jo (G1,a1). 
Next, for the axioms, it is helpful to define the (class) map [-]0 from So to S 
given by 
[(G, a)]0 = {(G,a') I a _.Ga'} , 
and associate with every formula cp in the language { =, E} of set theory the predicate 
(cp] 0 obtained by interpreting the quantifiers over So, the equality symbol = by 
::::::0 , and the membership symbol E by E0 . A crucial property of the interpretation 
cp ....... (cp] 0 is that for every formula cp, and quantifier Q E {V, 3}, 
[QxEy cp]o = Qx E [y]0 [<t?]o . 
This is a consequence of three facts: (1) ::::Jo is an equality for {So, ~o, Eo), (2) for 
every pg (G, a), and every x Eo (G, a), there is a y E [(G, a))0 where x ~o y, and (3) 
for every pg (G,a), every x E [(G,a))0 is Eo (G,a). 
Now, to establish the analog to Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.7 in Aczel [4] 
(implying the system V,, constructed there is full), define the predicate 
Copy(G,a,A) ~ \:/(G',a') E So (G 1 ,a') Eo (G,a) = 
3(G~,a~) EA (G~,a~) :=:::o (G1,a1) 
and assert 
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Lemma8. (KP-) For every set (i.e., member of the class S) A~ So, there 
is a (G,a) E So unique up to ~0 such that Copy(G,a,A). 
Proof. Given such an A, pick an a (/. LJ{ NG' I ( G', a') E A} (justified by 
an argument by contradiction using Ll0-separation and the Russell set) and 
define (over (S, ~, E)) 
No:= {a} U LJ{Nor I (G',a') EA} 
-+o := {(a,a') I (G',a') EA} U LJ{-+ar I (G',a') EA}. 
Then Copy(G,a,A) holds. Moreover, to prove uniqueness up to ~0 , suppose 
Copy(G1 ,a1,A) were true. Constructing a bisimulation between G and G1 
relating a to a 1 appears simple enough - take 
{(a,a1)} U {(b,b1) E No x Na1 I 
3( G', a') E A t/l( G, b, G', a') A t/J( G 1, b1, G', a')} 
where t/J(X, y, U, v) is 3R Bis(R, X, y, U, v ). But the existential quantifier 
in 1/; must be either bounded using Power, or else the definition cannot be 
justified by KP's limited separation principles. Fortunately, a more delicate 
argument is possible. Given an R satisfying 
Vb+-o a 3(G',a') EA Bis(R,G,b,G',a') /I. 
V(G',a') EA 3b +-o a Bis(R,G,b,G',a') 
and an R1 satisfying 
\::/(G', a') EA 3b1 +-01 ai Bis(R1, G', a', G1,b1) /I. 
\::/bi +-01 a1 3(G',a') EA Bis(R1, G', a', G1,b1) , 
compose R with R1 and throw in (a,a1 ) to form a bisimulation between G 
and G1 relating a to a1 . It remains to show how to construct the required R 
and R1 . Observe that R can be obtained by applying E-collection (as given 
in Barwise [5], Theorem 4.4, p. 17) first to 
Vb +-o a 3R' 3(G',a') EA Bis(R',G,b,G',a'), 
then to 
V(G',a') EA 3R' 3b +-a a Bis(R1 ,G,b,G1,a1 ) 
(which hold since Copy(G, a, A)), and forming the union. Constructing R1 
is similar. -I 
Preservation of the axioms is proved a la Rieger's theorem (Aczel [4]) by applying 
Lemma 8 to a suitable A for the existence (or in the case of Extensionality, the 
uniqueness up to ~0) of a required (G, a) E S0 • 
Extensionality: given (Go,ao) and (G1,a1) in So such that 
V(G',a1) E So (G',a') Eo (Go,ao) = (G1,a1) Eo (G1,ai), 
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then Copy(Go,ao,[(G,a)]0 ) and Copy(G1,a1,[(G,a)]0), whence Lemma 8 yields 
(Go,ao) ~o (G1,ai). 
Pair: given ( G, a), ( G', a') E S0 , appeal to Lemma 8 with A = { ( G, a), ( G', a')}. 
Union: given ( G, a) E So, appeal to Lemma 8 with A = LJ{[( G, a')]0 I a --.G a'}. 
Separation: given a formula cp(x) and (G,a) E S0 , let A be the set 
{(G, a') E ((G, a)]0 I (cp((G, a'))]o} 
(which exists, assuming (S, ~, E} satisfies Separation). 
Collection: let cp(x,y) be a formula and (G,a) E So such that 
'Vx Eo (G, a) 3y E So [cp(x, y)]o . 
Assuming (S, ::::::, E) satisfies Collection, there is a set B such that 
'Vx E ((G,a)]0 3y E B [<p(x,y)]o. 
Appeal to Lemma 8 with A= B n So. 
AFA: Let g be a pg such that ["g is a graph"]0 . A first attempt would be to apply 
Lemma 8 to {BE So I [1P]o} where 'ljJ is 
3xENg B = (x, {z Ix -'>g z}). 
Unfortunately, this class is not a set, the problem being that given a pg (G,a), 
a proper class of pg's (G',a') may satisfy (G',a') Eo (G,a). (Similarly, with ::::::o.) 
This suggests a different interpretation of the language of set theory, obtained by 
interpreting the quantifiers over S0 , = by~, and E by E [-]0 . Write [ip] 0 for the 
result of applying this interpretation to some formula cp. 12 Now, if d is the result of 
applying Lemma 8 to {BE So I [7,b]0 }, then it follows that for every x Eo Na, 
Vy Eo d(x) [x -.11 y]o /\ l:/z [x --..'1 z]o ~ z Eo d(x), 
whence (by Extensionality), 
x ::::::o d(x) 
::::::a { z I x -. !} z} 
::::::o { d( z) I x -. .q z} , 
12 Ideally, 
[cp(x)]o = 3y ::::::ox [cp(Y)] 0 
would always hold; however, counter-examples such as--. xE:x' are easy to find. Counter-
examples not involving negation are more difficult to produce, and the author suspects 
that the above equivalence might hold for (E-formulas) <p constructed "non-negatively" 
(allowing for bounded quantification, which might be justified by L'-collection). If so, then 
separation and collection over non-negative .do-formulas might be true in (So, ;::::o, Eo). 
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that is, ["dis a decoration of g"]o. Furthermore, if d' E So satisfies ["d' is a decoration 
of g"]o, then d ~o d', since for every x Eo N0 , there is a bisimulation between d(x) 
and d1(x) (whence d(x) ~o d'(x)). 
Infinity: given an a E S that makes Infinity true (i.e., "a = w") in (S, :::::!, E), apply 
Lemma 8 to the set A obtained by applying £'-collection to 'efn E a 3b P( n, b) where 
P(n,b) ~ 3f function(!) /\ dom(f) ~ n /\ Q(f,b,n) /\ Vk En Q(j,j(k),k) 
and 
Q(f,x,y)-# (Ve E [x]0 3z E y f(z) ~ c) /\ (Vz E y f(z) E [x]0). 
Power: given (G,a) E So, apply Lemma 8 to a set A such that 
'efx E Pow([(G,a)]0 ) 3(G',a') EA Copy(G1,a1,x) 
(again obtained by E-collection, noting that Copy can be put in E-form13 ). 
Choice: choice functions can be produced in 80 (assuming such exist in S) as in the 
proof of Rieger's theorem in Aczel [4]. 
-l 
The problem with preserving .'10-separation and .do-collection is the unbounded 
existential quantifier in the definition of ~o (whence the passage from t.p to [<p]o does 
not preserve .d-formulas). Since a bisimulation R between G and G' relating a to a' 
where a E Na and a1 E Ne, can be taken to be a subset of Ne x Na,, the problem 
is overcome by assuming Power.14 
Corollary 9. If S, ~ and E are (APP+ ECA)-classes such that 
(S, ~, E) f= KP- + Power 
then the classes So, ~o and Eo in Theorem 7 form a model of KP- +Power+ AFA. 
As already mentioned, the theory 
T :=APP+ ECA + Obj-indN 
of explicit mathematics is proof-theoretically equivalent to PRA, according to Jager 
[13]. Within T, classes S, ~, E can be defined (as in the previous section) such that 
(S, ~, E) f= KP1 + Power 
13 That is, Copy ( G, a, x) can be re-expressed as 
V(G',a') E [(G,a)J 0 :l(G'1 ,a'1 ) EA (G',a') ~o (G~,a~) /\ 
V(G',a') EA (G',a') Eo (G,a). 
14 As Prof. Barwise has pointed out to the author, the notation KP- + Power might be 
interpreted as requiring that the powerset predicate is taken to be .<1 0 . This is not neces-
sary, because all possible bisimulations referred to in [-Jo-translating a .<1 0 -formula can 
be found in a set constructed from (the interpretations of) its free variables (since all 
quantifiers are bounded). 
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(where, by Lemma 5, KP1 +Power= PRA). Combined with Corollary 9, this provides 
an illustration of the finitary character of AFA. From the point of view of admissible 
sets (and more generally, computational theories based on enumeration), however, 
Power is an undesirable axiom that is best avoided (or at least weakened to Power 
or Infinity), and its use for capturing the largest bisimulation suggests a certain 
impredicativity about AFA somewhat at odds with the claim that the axiom is 
finitistic. The question arises as to whether the existence of a bisimulation can be 
expressed by a Ll-predicate over a finitist (i.e., at most primitive recursive) subsystem 
of KP. A natural attempt at answering this question affirmatively would involve some 
principle of induction.15 
4 Induction and the largest bisimulation 
In practice, a good deal of the proof-theoretic strength of a set theory lies in its 
induction principles. Over a universe of possibly non-well-founded sets, however, 
such principles must be formulated carefully (given the difficulty in applying these 
globally). The approach taken below is to introduce a unary relation symbol Ord plus 
suitable axioms, and to relativize the induction principles to Ord. More precisely, 
let KPOrd be KP plus 
Ord(0) 
Ord(x) :) Ord(x U {x}) 
Vy Ex Ord(y) :) Ord(LJx) 
Ord(x) :) Vy Ex (Ord(y) /\ Vz E y z Ex). 
(Note that this is a conservative extension of KP since, under foundation, Ord(x) 
can be given a Ll0-definition, as in Barwise [5].) Now, let KPf>rd be the result of 
replacing foundation in KPOrd by (E1 + .U1)1A relativized to Ord: 
vorrl0t.(Vf3 E aip(f3) :) ip(0t.)} :) von:ta. i,o(o) 
for E1- and .U1-formulas ip (where v0ra.a. x is Va Ord(a.) :::> x). KPfrd supports the 
( E1 -recursion rule) Ord 
Vz, x, w 3!y .,P(z, x, w, y) 
\;fOrda \:/W 3!y 4'(0t., w, y; t/l(z, a, w, y)) 
where 4'(x, w, y; 1/i(z, x, w, y)) is the defining formula for the function derived by 
recursion from a E 1-formula 7/i(z, x, w, y) (see section 2). This rule provides a con-
structive (i.e., ordinal) approach to the least and greatest fixed points of certain 
inductive definitions. 16 
15 A negative answer for a particular subsystem T might proceed by choosing an appropriate 
model of T, with respect to which a. ..1-definition of the largest bisimulation would lead 
to a contradiction. The interest in such a result would depend largely on the interest in 
the model used. The author has tried and failed to push through such an argument for 
L(wfK). 
16 The reader is referred to Aczel [2] for far more background than is presently required. 
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Assume cp( R, x) is a .d predicate in which R occurs positively and for which there 
are .d-predicates <p 1 (a, x) and <p J (a, x) satisfying for all a such that Ord (a), 
cp1( a, x) = ip(3/3 E a n(/3, - ), x) 
and for o: > 0, 
<p1(a,x) =. <p(V/3 Ea ip;(/3,-),x). 
Implicit here is the assumption that 3/3 E a n(/3, - ) defines a set (i.e., {a I 3/3 E 
a <pr(f3, a)}), as does, for o: > 0, V,8 E a C/'J(/3, - ). The idea is to characterize the 
least fixed point I 'I' and the greatest fixed point J 'I' of cp( R, x) by 
I'l'(x) = 30rdo: cpr(a, x) 
J'P(x) =. \fOrda cpJ(a,x). 
(1) 
(2) 
Typically, -<:=: of (1) and :::;.. of (2) are justified by induction principles, while the 
converses rest on a cardinality argument - i.e., a well-ordering principle that enables 
induction to be enforced globally (on all sets). But, how are the left hand sides defined 
in the first place? If we agree that 
J'P(x) # 3R (Vy E R cp(R, y) /\ x E R) , 
then (2) makes J'P(x) .d. Note that stipulating 
Iip(x) # \fR (\fy (cp(R, y) ::) y E R) ::) x E R) 
not only fails to lower the complexity of J'l'(x) given by (1), but is, in fact, incorrect, 
since the variable R must range over classes (including proper ones for choices of 
cp(R, x) such as x = x). As for the corresponding definition above of Jip(x), the point 
is that the argument R in <p( R, y) must be a set, which in the terminology of Aczel 
(4] induces a "set continuous" class operator 
R 1-+ {a I 31·(E V) 1· ~ R /\ ip(r,a)}. 
We now apply these ideas to a concrete case. 
Towards an inductive construction of a bisimulation between pointed graphs 
( N,-+ ), a and ( N', -+1), a', define 
<p(R,a,a';N,-+,N1,-+1)#aEN /\ a'eN' /\. 
Vx ~a 3y ~' a1 xRy /\ \fy ~'a' 3x +-a xRy. 
Lemma 10. Over KPfrrl, a Ll predicate cp;(o:, a, a'; N, -+, N', -+1) can be constructed 
such that 
cp;(O, a, a'; N, -+, N', -+1):: a EN /\ a' EN' , 
and for all a =fa 0 such that Ord( a), 
'PJ(a, a, a'; N, -+, N', -+') = 'f!(Vf3 E Oi. VJi(/3, -, -'; N, -+, N', -+1), a, a'; N, -+, N', -+1) • 
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Consider next what principles are needed to establish the following assertion: for 
all pointed graphs (N, _,),a and (N1, -> 1), a', 
:3R Bis(R, (N, _,),a, (N', -'),a')=: v0 rda 'f!J(a, a, a'; N, _., N', ->') , (3) 
where recall from section 2 that Bis( R, G, a, G', a') says that R is a bisimulation 
between G and G' relating a to a'. ( =>) follows from I/1 IA, even if relativized to 
Ord, applied to the slightly modified assertion: for all graphs (N, _,) and (N', ->1), 
for every ordinal a, and for all x E N and y E N', 
::!R Bis(R, (N,-> ), x, (N', ->'), y) .:::> i.p1(a, x, y; N, _., N', ->1) • 
The base case a= 0 is trivial, and the induction step is routine. Conversely, (-;:=) of 
(3) is implied by the following assertion 'If;: for all graphs (N, _,)and (N', -> 1), there 
is an ordinal & such that 
\Ix EN Vy EN' 'PJ(&,x,y;N,->,N1,->1) .:::> vord/3 'f'J(f3,x,y;N,->,N1,-.'). 
The reason is that from 'If;, it follows that the set 
R := {(x,y) EN x N' I 'f'J(&.,x,y;N,->,N',_,1)} 
is a bisimulation between (N,->) and (N', -> 1), and, assuming the right hand side 
of (3) holds, aRa'. Note that 7/;* (where-* is the translation from the language of 
set theory to the language of arithmetic given in section 2) is provable in E?-IA, 
the point being that, under -*, the "closure ordinal" & can be computed primitive 
recursively from (N, _,) and (N', -'). By Lemma 5 and the preceding discussion of 
(3), it follows that 
Theorem 11. KPfrd +'If; is a primitive recursive set theory, relative to which the 
largest bisimulation is Ll. More precisely, KP f>rd +'If; is proof-theoretically equivalent 
to PRA, and proves (3) for all pointed graphs (N, -), a and (N', -> 1), a1• 
We leave to the interested reader the question of whether KPfrd +'If; is contained 
in a theory T proof-theoretically equivalent to PRA, lying between KP- and KP 
(plus, if necessary, a global well-ordering principle), for which the passage from 
S, ~, E to So, ~o, Eo in the previous section sends models of T to models of T +A FA. 
The author suggests taking T to be KPfrrl, although he has (alas) been unable to 
determine whether or not this works. 
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